

## STYLE AND SUBSTANCE: T. S. ELIOT, JACQUES MARITAIN, AND NEO-THOMISM

James Matthew Wilson

### *Eliot among the Neo-Scholastics*

In a December 1917 review entitled "A Contemporary Thomist," T.S. Eliot pays critical but appreciative tribute to the emergence of the New Scholasticism and also to the Catholic Church in general, which the "non-Catholic reader" must recognize as "the only Church which can even pretend to maintain a philosophy of its own" (312). Fr. Peter Coffey's two-volume *Epistemology* occasions the observation, but Eliot indicates he has followed the rise of this Catholic philosophy for some time. Earlier in the year, he had reviewed Cardinal Mercier's forbidding *A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy* (1916), which distilled the entire curriculum in philosophy for turn-of-the-century seminarians at the great University of Louvain. And Eliot repeatedly mentioned his familiarity with the work of Fr. John Rickaby, an English Jesuit whose writings on metaphysics and epistemology complemented Coffey's as part of the extensive Stonyhurst Philosophical Series. Eliot's reactions to the neo-Scholastic (later called neo-Thomist) philosophy are remarkable in several ways. In his notice of Mercier's *Manual*, he asserted that no "student of contemporary philosophy can afford to neglect the neo-scholastic movement since 1879" (137). Such familiarity with the

decisive early history of neo-Thomism—particularly with Leo XIII's encyclical *Aeterni Patris* (1879), which formally initiated neo-Thomism as the philosophical school and project of the Church—was rare, if not altogether unheard of, for non-Catholic intellectuals at the time.<sup>1</sup>

More significant than this broad-minded curiosity, however, is Eliot's diagnosis of these new Scholastics. Although Rickaby's work had shown familiarity with "non-scholastic contemporary philosophy," Coffey's *Epistemology* takes as its "chief enemy" Immanuel Kant. One would expect any neo-Scholastic study of epistemology to confront the leader of the "Copernican revolution" in thought, who displaced metaphysics by elevating the problem of knowledge to a central role in modern philosophy, and Coffey's volume "erects a very powerful barricade" against him (312). However, opines Eliot, when Coffey turns "from this discredited philosopher to deal with contemporaries he is much less successful" (312). Eliot expresses particular disappointment that, among Coffey's rare references to contemporary thinkers, the names of Bertrand Russell and F. H. Bradley are nowhere to be found. "These two writers, between them," he observes, "have nearly laid metaphysics in the grave" (312). In failing to answer the late English voices of neo-idealism and neo-realism, Coffey's argument loses much of its salience. Moreover, from Eliot's language, it would seem that Coffey only defeats a "discredited" idealist, Kant, while ignoring the still vital idealism of Bradley.

Such failure to engage contemporaries adequately is, in fact, only the second of two major qualifications Eliot adds to his praise of Coffey's work. Prior to this complaint about the substance of the argument, Eliot confesses a certain disorientation consequent to the prose style in which it is set forth. "Those who have read philosophy with complete detachment from any schools have trained themselves to look for just those aspects of any author which are most personal," says Eliot: "In reading Aristotle, for instance, we are in touch with a mind that regarded the world quite freshly and independently; when we read him carefully, we discover the world again with him, and find him halting, stumbling, too intent on the truth at any moment, to be always consistent" (312).<sup>2</sup> Things could not be more different with the neo-Thomists. In their work, "we are not conscious of the pioneer spirit. The wilderness is already conquered; it remains only to make the conquest secure, to render the country habitable and fortify it against attack" (312). Not only have Bradley's contributions to philosophy been passed over in silence, but the argument is made in far too loud and triumphalist a style—a style particularly offensive to one acclimated to Bradley's prose, which Eliot repeatedly held up as a free-standing achievement, and which Jewel Spears Brooker has followed Eliot in describing as a "combination of humility and

irony, of feeling and intelligence" (189). However dogmatic and elliptically argued Eliot's own prose could appear, even the later work nearly always qualified a certainty of observation with a confession of the impossibility of precise definition. Such are not the most evident attributes of Coffey's book. A "detached" historical presentation of different stages and problems of epistemology hardly describes the author's ambitions. The style rather is triumphalist and pugnacious, for Coffey's explicit goal is not to educate seminarians for quiet service in the Universal Church, but to prepare them like soldiers to defend her against such elusive but ubiquitous modern enemies as indifferentism, materialism, scientism, idealism, skepticism, and agnosticism.<sup>3</sup> The sweeping neglect of post-Kantian idealism is no more incidental. Coffey does not believe philosophy ends with Kant, only that its continuations are in essence derivative. In the preface, he notes, "most of the modern theories draw their inspiration directly or indirectly from principles propounded in [Kant's] *Critiques*, so that the student who can appraise these principles on their merits will be in a position to deal with those theories in whatever guise they may confront him" (vii-viii). Kant's philosophy begins by exploring the reason of the subject rather than the nature of being, as do, one way or another, all modern philosophers. This erroneous point of departure condemns them all. Why, we are asked, bother to explore the nuances of later idealism, when the foundation on which they have been built—even if built in reaction—can be thoroughly demolished?

Eliot's review testifies that he is neither persuaded by this summary dismissal of Bradley (et al.) nor comfortable with a prose style that insists at every turn that epistemology is a science to be learned and preserved rather than a mode of exploration admixed inevitably with error. And yet Eliot's interest in the new Scholasticism suggests that he remained open to its playing a role in his own "halting, stumbling" raids on truth. He perhaps awaited a presentation of the philosophy that could address more directly the virtues and inadequacies of post-Kantian philosophy, and which could do so in a style more hospitable to one still crying in the wilderness. He was anticipating a philosopher whose work would neither indulge in the individuality that Eliot finds attracting the "detached" interest of the student nor the silencing diatribes of Coffey.

Eliot would find much of what he was waiting for in the early writings of Jacques Maritain. In this essay, I shall return briefly to Eliot's dissertation on Bradley's idealism in order to adduce its formative influence on the way Eliot believed philosophy ought to be done and also what we might call its inadequate influence—the failure of such idealism to reconcile convincingly the aporia Eliot sensed between the subject and the world, and between the real and the ideal. It will then be propitious to suggest how Maritain's

style of philosophizing promised to reconcile what idealism could not. In a prose apparently no less attractive than Bradley's in Eliot's eyes, Maritain set forth his Thomist philosophy not as if it were pitted in combat with the non-Catholic modern world, but rather as if it were engaged dialectically in its history, offering to that world what it had lost but sorely desired. Characterizing the modern western world in terms with which Eliot already agreed, Maritain intervened in nearly every facet of its intellectual life, stitching together a seamless garment of aesthetics, political theory, semiotics, and mystical theology all founded on a Thomist metaphysics. *Style led to substance*, that is, to a vision of the world entirely ordered to being.

Thomism seemed to provide the metaphysical support Eliot required to ground his classicism in real (ontological) rather than mere historical or ideal (relative) terms. We shall see that even in *The Waste Land* Eliot was revising his own poetic vision in a Thomist-realist direction; in that poem and its accompanying notes, Eliot would subtly shift his assessment of Bradley's idealism to conform with Thomist realist critiques of it as solipsistic. And yet we shall also see that the promise Maritain came to symbolize did not entirely "satisfy" Eliot ("Three Reformers" 818); the distinctions he drew between himself and Maritain hint at the decision on Eliot's part that style and substance had not been entirely harmonized by the neo-Thomist and that, perhaps, they need not be. Eliot's views after his conversion to Christianity in 1927 may gradually have displaced the imperatives of metaphysics with those of theology. In the essay's concluding section, I shall consider the Augustinian turn Eliot's thought took under the influence of Pascal; this turn would draw his interests away from the realism Maritain's writings provided and toward a varied Christian Platonism. Maritain's work would take a similar turn—in many ways inspired by Eliot himself—that would lead him to formulate, in a Thomist realist context, theories of affective knowledge regarding the creative intuition of the poets and the experience of the Christian mystics. But these later parallels between Eliot and Maritain serve primarily to underscore that the moment of their closest association came when Eliot most needed a credible metaphysical realism and when Maritain was most assiduous to provide such a realism to modern artists in Paris and beyond.

### *From Idealism to Realism in Eliot's Early Criticism*

Scholars of Bradley's influence on Eliot have consistently remarked that a central aim of Bradley's neo-idealism was to overcome the dualisms that had haunted modern philosophy since Descartes. While dualistic thinking

per se is characteristic of modern thought, the two dualisms that Eliot sought to dissolve in the writing of his dissertation, *Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley* (1915-16), were, first, the opposition of subject and object, and, second, the distinction between the real and the ideal. In brief, Eliot follows Bradley in affirming that the distinction between subject and object is neither absolute nor necessary; it is, rather, epiphenomenal to the foundation of human knowledge, which Bradley calls "immediate experience." By this phrase, Bradley intends everything that is, that can be experienced, prior to the processes of abstraction or, in his words, relational consciousness. Only when we begin to think in and about our experience do we build up a world of "objects," ranging from space and time to subject and object, or "me" and "him."<sup>4</sup> Eliot insists, in a way that separates him from Bradley, that the reality of immediate experience is only hypothetical. We cannot know it, because to know it would mean to perceive in terms of relations that state which precedes all relations (*Knowledge and Experience* 18). Even so, it is a necessary hypothesis, for all our abstractions must originate somewhere. There must be some ground of un-cognized experience that is real, where all the partially true points of view of appearance are unified in one whole truth; immediate experience therefore confers reality on our objects (including the object of our selves) and attenuates the reality of those objects as mere abstractions (Eliot, *Knowledge and Experience* 31).

Bradley and Eliot alike seek to demolish the hypostatized dualism of subject-and-object by insisting that these are abstractions among others derived from immediate experience. Eliot's later chapters contend, therefore, that epistemology as a branch of philosophy has been grounded on a false premise. Insofar as epistemology is the study of whether and how a subject can know the objective world, Eliot argues it has no object to study, for the thinking subject and the perceived or thought object are equally abstractions from immediate experience. We shall return to this later, so let me underscore the consequence of such a formulation: the putative aporia between subject and object that idealists from Descartes onward had struggled to grasp is rooted in a failure to grasp that subject and object are continuous in experience and become two only in the posterior abstraction that constitutes relational consciousness. The prospect of a subject being locked up in himself, unable to touch upon objects—extra-mental beings in general or specifically other subjects—is, strictly speaking, an impossibility. Solipsism does not obtain in immediate experience, though it may be possible as one abstraction among others (cf. Eliot, *Knowledge and Experience* 87). The vital premise at the heart of the dissertation resides here: any mode of inquiry, epistemology, psychology, or otherwise that privileges the subjective consciousness of the self—including the privileging of shutting the subject off

from the world of objects—is merely the study of one posterior abstraction, and therefore provides an extremely narrow partial account of the many partial points-of-view (appearances) that constitute the whole of reality.

When we hear, in Eliot's account of Bradley, a neo-idealist philosophy that attempts to dissolve the subject-object distinction foundational to idealism in general, we should observe not only a rejection of fears of solipsism, but also a critique of the romantic egoism that privileges the interior infinity of the thinking subject over the finite reality of the external world. Dissolving subject and object into immediate experience demotes the egoistic individualism typical of one tradition of modern thought simply by claiming it is an inadequate abstraction from general experience. The overcoming of the epistemological troubles of idealism is only the first of two major problems Eliot's dissertation tackles, however. He also dissolves the distinction between "real" and "ideal" that had made modern philosophical materialism possible.<sup>5</sup> Eliot seems quite aware that only in the esoteric tomes of idealist philosophers and the eccentric verses of romantic poets does the world seem threatened with absorption into the intellect, the ego, of the self. Scientific and technological advances, and the positivist philosophy they inspired, had made varieties of philosophical materialism—where scientific knowledge alone counted as "knowledge," and everything else was ruled an unreal idea, a mere "experience"—both common and imposing. Damian P. Fedoryka has recently argued that

As a result of this bifurcation of experience and so-called scientific knowledge, we have a devaluation of "subjective experience" that is subordinated to if not crushed by objective, that is, "scientific" truth. That has its consequences for the experience of one's own dignity. Self-affirmation, in the face of what appears an apparently relentless and dehumanizing progress of science and objective truth, almost inevitably brings with it, as a self-protective response, a spreading skepticism and relativism. It is as if the affirmation of one's own dignity required the rejection of objective truth, which binds the subject. (50)

Although Eliot usually seems to reject the mode of idealism that skeptically divided the subject's intellect from the world of objects, the dissertation suggests he was powerfully drawn to the relativistic attempt to reconcile real and ideal found in Bradley's philosophy.<sup>6</sup> The very term "experience" served to circumvent definitions of the real as only that which had material being or that which was experimentally verifiable. Eliot writes near the opening of the dissertation, "Experience alone is real, but everything can be experienced" (18). My imagining of a character in a novel is no less an experience than a heavy stone dropping on my foot, it is merely a different experience. Thoughts of love are no less real than the mechanics of procreation. In

order to make this case, Eliot must, once again, dissolve the terms real and ideal in the primary but unknowable reality of immediate experience. All terms are "unreal abstractions" that nonetheless are *relatively* real because they give a partial account of experience.<sup>7</sup> The nominally real and ideal are in continuous, inseparable relation in consciousness because they dissolve into one in experience. The artwork is no mere flight of the fancy; religious belief is not some gratuitous fantasy foisted upon the perceptible materiality of the real. This rock on the ground is no less an abstraction than Hamlet or God.

Fedoryka's account of skepticism and relativism as defenses against modern scientific materialism suggests how fragile both positions are. The skeptic, to preserve a sense of personal dignity, doubts that scientific knowledge provides real knowledge. The relativist disputes the application of scientific or technological knowledge outside a closed realm of phenomena, thereby giving equally limited reality to the physical as to the cultural or intellectual. When the skeptics and relativists are confronted with some brute mechanism of nature or technology, however, they collapse into listlessness or even despair at the dehumanizing objectivity of the world. In Bradley, Eliot briefly thought he had found a means of preserving the ideal by reducing it and the real alike to abstractions from experience. But in the process of subjecting this possibility to critical formulation, he became incapable of believing it.

In a letter to Norbert Wiener of 6 January 1915, Eliot gave an account of his own consciousness of this untenable situation. Responding to an important early essay of Wiener's called "Relativism," Eliot maintained that it was possible to be a "relative idealist or a relative realist," by which, in the context of the essay, he intends acceptance of a philosophical position without hope of establishing certitude (*Letters* 1.87). He, however, inclines toward "relative materialism." Worse than mere abstraction, philosophy, in Eliot's words, is a "perversion of reality." In a formula that anticipates his account of a "detached" reading of philosophy, Eliot contends that new philosophy begins in "a revolt of common sense against some other theory" only to end up as "equally preposterous" as what it would replace (1.87). The only condition or point to which all things refer is the material. Our language necessarily operates "with reference to the universe of physical science," and behavior in general tends to conform to the "mechanistic world" rather than to the preposterous abstractions of philosophy (1.87).

The letter indicates that Eliot reached these conclusions consequent to his dissertation work on Bradley. The careful parsing of neo-idealism in which Eliot engaged left him unable either to accept Bradley's concept of the "Absolute" toward which all knowledge reaches, or the careful defense of immediate experience we have examined. The dissertation became "entirely

destructive" (1.80), and without the prop of immediate experience, Eliot fell back upon the materialism of his former teacher, George Santayana.<sup>8</sup> Paraphrasing positions outlined most clearly in Santayana's *Interpretations of Poetry and Religions* (1900) and "Philosophical Heresy" (1915), Eliot acknowledges that the real world is the material world, and philosophy is the elegant, useless superstructure built upon it.<sup>9</sup> Because only philosophy's elegance or beauty matters, of course, it becomes subsumed in art and poetry. Hence, Eliot concludes, relativism recommends that one "avoid philosophy and devote oneself to either *real* art or *real* science" (1.81), to knowledge of the material world or to the uncertain aesthetic experience that appears like a cherished, irrelevant texture woven upon it.

While it may have been possible for Eliot to remain a "relative materialist" in perpetuity, we know from the constant presence of ethical scrutiny in his poems and from the fact of his conversion to Anglo-Catholicism in 1927 that he did not. Furthermore, his prose writings consistently attest to a particular dissatisfaction with his historical position in an age that is at once enthralled to scientific materialism and has recoiled upon diverse species of romanticism and idealism as a means of justifying the meaning and dignity of human life. In contexts other than academic philosophy, Eliot sought solutions to the dualistic problems of subject and object, of real and ideal, that resembled Bradley's writings in ambition but seemed more promising in method. Bradley, again, had affirmed the reality, such as it was, of the extra-mental, material real and of the intra-mental ideal by relativizing them as partial expressions of the whole of complete and "immediate experience." Such a monistic synthesis could not long satisfy, it would seem. Eliot felt a tendency to acknowledge the material as real *per se*—a tendency that modern scientism encourages—while he was left with only the resources of the materialist Santayana to approve the "value"—rather than the reality—of art, philosophy, and ideas (*Letters* 81).

In the early works of neo-Scholasticism, he encountered strong critiques of modern idealism and defenses of the moderate realist metaphysics of Aquinas. The works of Coffey and Mercier were well suited to Eliot's philosophical training, despite his protests to the contrary, because they each approached metaphysics by means of epistemology. That is, like Eliot, they treated the problem of knowledge as a subject of importance, even if, unlike post-Kantian philosophy, they did not effectively reduce metaphysics to epistemology.<sup>10</sup> Their practice was to justify knowledge and the reality of ideas not in reference to material beings, but in reference to being *per se*. Consequently, one sees a consistent argument in neo-Scholasticism that grants equal reality to what Eliot called the "real and the ideal" not by dissolving them in experience, but by explaining the diverse shares material

things and ideas each have in being.

Coffey, Mercier, and others promised, in other words, that the life of the mind and soul, that the very concepts "mind" and "soul," were not epiphenomena needlessly set upon the bedrock of the mechanistic world. Moreover, the neo-Scholastics showed that one need not resist or reject what they argued was an immediate, intuitive grasp of the reality of the material if one was to affirm the intellectual, emotional, or supernatural. In Eliot's Clarke lectures, he would celebrate these attributes in medieval Scholasticism at the expense of modern philosophy. After Descartes, philosophy and culture in general tended toward "psychologism," an obsession with certitude and the aporia between mind and world. But in the twelfth century, Scholastics maintained "ontologism," that is, the sense that the mind is ordered to being: because "being is the proper object of the intellect" (Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* I, 5, 2), it is what we know first and best. Whatever other difficulties may inhere in intellection, its fundamental orientation to the stuff of reality, being, is not among them. Therefore, the journey of the intellect to a knowledge of Being Itself (God) was a *real* journey rather than a mere interior flight of fancy (Eliot, *Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry* 83). Losing sight of this confident intellectualism and metaphysical realism, modern thought embraced psychologism and so "gave rise to the whole of the pseudo-science of epistemology which has haunted the nightmares of the last three hundred years" (*Varieties* 81). Eliot appreciated that "ontologism" began in the moderate realism of Aristotle and reached its perfection in Aquinas, Richard of St. Victor, and Dante (*Varieties* 104).<sup>11</sup> It was one of Eliot's central aims in the Clarke lectures to justify metaphysical poetry because it was a poetic style capable of grasping the real and ideal alike; equivocating on the term "metaphysical," Eliot suggests that such poetry grasps being in its fullness rather than locking up the mind within itself as do romantic poets, or severing intellect and emotion as do nearly all poets after Milton (*Selected Essays* 247).

However, except for Dante and his circle, all the poets Eliot describes as metaphysical he also describes as having fallen to different extents from ontologism into psychologism. Some few modern poets might resist psychologism, but they could not escape it unless they could live in a culture properly ordered to metaphysical truth (*Varieties* 221). Santayana's influence had no doubt helped Eliot to appreciate the ordered, objective beauty of Dante and Aquinas. The productivity of neo-Scholasticism Eliot lauded in 1917 suggested that such beauty need not necessarily remain a historical curiosity: the intellectual elite of the Catholic Church was arguing that Scholasticism was a true and potent antidote to modern errors. However attractive Eliot found Dante's metaphysical beauty, however serious an in-

tellektual achievement he felt neo-Scholasticism to be, he was evidently put off by the triumphalist style of Coffey and others, which seemed to insist on their obvious rectitude in solving problems about which Eliot's apprenticeship in Bradley's thought had shown nothing was merely obvious.

*In Search of Metaphysical Foundations for Classicism*

The prizing of intellectualism—of reason fused to and guiding emotion, in Dante and in the theology of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries—that Eliot expressed in his Clarke lectures has rightly been associated with what Eliot came to describe in general terms as the modern tendency toward "classicism." What he would describe to the students of Cambridge, later that winter, in terms of medieval theology and poetry, he outlines in the January 1926 number of *The Criterion* as a contemporary trend:

I believe that the modern tendency is toward something which, for want of a better name, we may call classicism. I use the term with hesitation, for it is hardly more than analogical.... Yet there is a tendency—discernable even in art—toward a higher and clearer conception of Reason, and a more severe and serene control of the emotions by Reason. If this approaches or even suggests the Greek ideal, so much the better: but it must inevitably be very different. ("The Idea of the Literary Review" 4)

Eliot's inspiration for the term "classicism" in the context of modern art and intellectual life derives, of course, initially from Charles Maurras, who used it, in 1904, to announce a new anti-romantic movement in French literature, and secondarily from T. E. Hulme's *Speculations*, which appeared twenty years later and translated Maurras's anti-romanticism to English soil, aligning it in the process with advanced art.<sup>12</sup> Because of this easily traced origin, scholars have generally overlooked the more substantial contribution Jacques Maritain made in outlining how modern "classicism" might build itself upon the same cornerstone as the works of Aquinas and Dante: the "severe and serene" doctrines of Scholastic metaphysics.

Following his outline of the classical tendency, Eliot offers a list of authors and works that exemplify that tendency; he includes the names of Maurras and Hulme (among others), but also makes reference to "*Réflexions sur l'intelligence*, by Jacques Maritain." Published the same year as Hulme's *Speculations*, *Réflexions* comprises a series of loosely connected chapters that address Thomist theories of knowledge to specific modern conundrums and confusions. The particular antagonists engaged, and the mode of engagement, could scarcely have been better crafted for an audience trained in post-Kantian idealism and yet suspicious of its tendency to romanticism and relativism, or to an audience thoroughly familiar with the ideological

power of modern materialism and positivism, and yet resistant to it.

The early chapters contain by some margin the most substantial explanations of Thomist intellectualism; they contend that the screen or aporia between subject and object that constituted the chief epistemological problem of Cartesian and Kantian idealism is one grounded in a poor understanding of the ontological nature of ideas as formal signs (3.41-42). On nearly every point, Maritain is little less dismissive of post-Kantian philosophy than was Coffey in his textbook.<sup>13</sup> And yet, he makes frequent reference to recent and contemporary thinkers (including Harvard's William James and the novels of his brother [3.309]) in his effort to show that all post-Kantian epistemologies have failed because they treat thought and knowledge as rarified subjective abstractions. They fail to recognize that the human mind is ordered to being and, therefore, one cannot have pure thought or knowledge, but only the idea of such-and-such or the knowledge of this-or-that (3.50-53). Theories of the intelligence that begin in the subject can never finally reach extra-mental being, because they fail to appreciate this a priori dependence of the mind on the encounter with actual beings for knowledge; Maritain would later argue that it "is absurd to demand that philosophical thought begin, even before it knows anything validly, by proving that it can know" (*Degrees of Knowledge* 78).<sup>14</sup> Therefore, modern epistemologies ineluctably conclude in severing the knower and the idea of a thing from the thing known. No matter how ingenious the effort of different idealists to delimit the mind's knowledge of objects, they are all equally untenable, because their epistemologies begin with the knower rather than the thing known.<sup>15</sup> Maritain's version of Thomist epistemology depends upon the concept of intentional being. By this term he expresses the manner in which an extra-mental thing can exist substantially (on its own), as *esse entitativum*, while it also comes to exist, once perceived and then known by the agent intellect, as *esse intentionale*, as an intentional being, an accident in the mind of a knower. Elaborating on these concepts, Maritain explains why a thing known is *really* present to the knower, and why, therefore, the idea of said thing is the thing itself under another mode of being, rather than a mere image or distorted impression of that thing. Intriguingly, Maritain's manner of explaining this point suggests a continuity between knower and known, subject, idea, and object that seems almost a translation into realist metaphysics of Eliot's dissertation contention that real and ideal are continuous.<sup>16</sup>

In subsequent chapters, Maritain critiques thinkers who, directly or by association, at one time influenced Eliot, whether by positive or negative example. Maritain's chapter on Blondel would not at first glance seem relevant to Eliot's own intellectual interests. However, Maritain argues against Blondel's theories of notional and real knowledge (102), a theory

Blondel developed out of John Henry Newman's *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (1870).<sup>17</sup> In the Clarke lectures, Eliot would of course denigrate Newman alongside Bradley as part of the modern tradition of "intellectual psychologism" that signaled the loss of the "severe and serene control of reason" (*Varieties* 93). More importantly, the penultimate chapter in *Réflexions* examines modern Anglo-American philosophy, critiquing the pluralism of Bradley and William James. Both are condemned because their philosophies are subjective expressions of defensiveness against the peculiar absolutisms of Hegelian monism and materialist positivism. Contemporary pluralist philosophers practice their discipline with the sentiment and will rather than with reason (3.309). In the process of condemning Eliot's former intellectual mentor, Maritain contrasts this pluralist voluntarism with the *classical* discipline of the ancient and medieval philosophers, who grounded their thought on an intellectual asceticism, a "severe disinterestedness" that aided them in working upon the material of their inquiry with the intelligence alone.<sup>18</sup> Given that Eliot seemed to recognize in idealism its necessary voluntarism, its act of will to subordinate the real to the ideal, and given that he had found himself falling into materialism in 1917, because he was no longer able to perform the act of will himself, these must have seemed prescient criticisms indeed. Maritain's writing appears scarcely less sure of its rational triumph than the earlier neo-Scholastics Eliot read. However, he sought to engage as a matter of course the philosophers Eliot knew; moreover, he sought to find good in them wherever possible, elevating and purifying it by ordering it within the moderate realist metaphysics of Aquinas.

The care Maritain took in his arguments clearly impressed Eliot, convincing him that here was a thinker capable of refounding an ontologically informed philosophy and objective or exact theology upon the rubble of modern idealism and materialism. E. W. F. Tomlin, in his memoir of Eliot, observes that he often "spoke about the need for an 'exact' theology, and Maritain, with his handbooks on logic, gave the impression of exactitude which most English theologians, brought up in the Hegelian tradition, failed to do" (73). Appropriately, when Eliot wrote a letter of introduction to Maritain for the young Tomlin in 1938, he referred to Tomlin as a "cadet of *The Criterion*" who was interested in aesthetics, sociology, and political philosophy, and "qui comprend l'importance fondamentale, pour notre époque, d'une théologie exacte [who understands the fundamental importance, for our age, of an exact theology]" (24 July 1938 Kolbsheim). Maritain promised what the circle surrounding Eliot's *Criterion* required.

Eliot evidently was as or more impressed with Maritain's style of presentation, however. In the last chapter of *Réflexions*, Maritain turns from the presentation of Thomist philosophy by way of critique of the moderns.

Abandoning the precision of philosophical argument, he seeks to outline a vision of the present age as returning to the Real. Two years before Eliot would recommend Maritain's book as exemplary of the "classical tendency" with its return to austere reason, Maritain would outline that tendency and insist that it would find its entelechy, its fulfillment, only in Thomist metaphysics. As had Eliot, Maritain felt justified in summarizing the self-image of historical periods and suggesting that they operated as *Zeitgeists*, partially determining the intellectual possibilities available to a given time (3.337-338). The recent past had been lost to idealism on the one hand and positivist materialism on the other, and both had offered inadequate accounts of reality because of their alternately purblind or narrow grasp of being. But the present moment witnessed tendencies toward "réalisme, intellectualisme, spiritualisme. Retour au réel et à absolu, par les voies de l'intelligence, pour la primauté de l'esprit [realism, intellectualism, spiritualism. A return to the real and the absolute, by the pathways of the intelligence, and for the primacy of the spirit]" (3.363). Maritain here offers as a platform what Stephen Schloesser has called "dialectical realism," where Catholic theology, ritual, and sacrament allowed one to penetrate at last to the real within, but often concealed by, mere appearances.<sup>19</sup> Rejecting the positivism and rationalism of an earlier generation, Maritain, Eliot, and other classicists or "dialectical realists" sought to recover the union of intellect and emotion, faith and reason, that modernity had seemed to rend asunder. For Maritain as for Eliot, this tendency particularly entails a rejection of romantic theories of the artist as mage or god (3.363). Convinced of the need for an exact theology grounded on a convincing metaphysics, Eliot would to a large extent find that need answered in Maritain's work. As such, he would eventually abandon his belief that the essential subject of study in philosophy is the individual personality of the philosopher. Whereas Coffey perhaps had argued with too much certainty and too little humanity, the evocative prose of Maritain may have helped Eliot to conclude that philosophy could at once respond to the sensed needs of its reader and make legitimate and lasting claims about the truth. In his late essay "Baudelaire in Our Time" (1932), Eliot would revise his account of what is of interest in a philosopher's or any writer's work:

We cannot be *primarily* interested in any writer's nerves (and remember please that "nerves" used in this way is a very vague and unscientific term) or in anyone's heredity except for the purpose of knowing to what extent that writer's individuality distorts or detracts from the objective truth which he perceives. If a writer sees truly—as far as he sees at all—then his heredity and nerves do not matter. (*Essays Ancient and Modern* 65)

Neither philosophy nor any literary work required one to choose between a rigorous account of "objective truth" and the interesting, but secondary, attributes of idiosyncrasy that Eliot had previously taken as the hallmarks of intellectual honesty. In 1917, still recovering from the disappointments of Bradley's philosophy and from advanced study in general, Eliot had thought it either naive or crude to claim that the truth had been conquered and required only further fortification. By 1932, he was convinced that there were convincing avenues to the truth, such as those in Maritain's Catholic but not conventionally "academic" (or "seminary") philosophy. As such, he could let go of the relativism that an interest in personality manifested in favor of the objective truth that matters.

If the essay on Baudelaire illustrates a subtle and partial debt to Maritain, Maritain would prove unhesitant in acknowledging his own appreciation for the work of Eliot as exemplary of the classical tendency. In 1939, Maritain revised the text of the last chapter of *Réflexions* in preparation for an English edition (which in fact was never published). In the revised text, Maritain mentions Paul Cezanne and Ernest Psichari (his close friend, the Catholic convert and novelist, who died in the War) as anticipating the return to the real which Maritain's book announced. He then added a citation of Eliot as its representative, despite the fact that by that late date Maritain had led many artists and writers, English and French, to embrace his Thomist philosophy of art.<sup>20</sup> Eliot unites a poetic gift with a well-developed critical intelligence and an admirable, rational lucidity that penetrates the deepest religious realities (3.365). In the mid-nineteen-twenties, then, Maritain promised Eliot an exact metaphysics and theology upon which could be founded an entire culture and a modern "ontological" art. Conversely, Maritain subsequently came to see in Eliot the highest realization in poetry of what he had prescribed in theory.

### The Waste Land's *Thomist Critique of Modern Thought*

This intersection of Eliot's classicism with Maritain's neo-Thomist metaphysics of the real provides occasion for us to consider one instance when neo-Thomism may have informed Eliot's poetry. A late passage from the "What the Thunder Said" section of *The Waste Land* has usually been assumed to represent the conditions of solipsism and alienation that the poem suggests are typical for modern persons. When the thunder begins to speak, "DA," it immediately echoes thus:

*Dayadhvam:* I have heard the key  
Turn in the door once and turn once only

We think of the key, each in his prison  
 Thinking of the key, each confirms a prison  
 Only at nightfall, aethereal rumours  
 Revive for a moment a broken Coriolanus (*Complete Poems and Plays* 49)

The notes at the end of the poem inform us that "*Dayadhvam*" means "sympathize" in the *Upanishads* (54), and we naturally conclude that this passage is ironic. The introduction of the word "sympathize" is followed by an echoing passage that seems to describe the mind's imprisonment within the self. When we turn once more to the notes, we find Eliot quotes from the tableau of Count Ugolino in Dante's *Inferno*. Ugolino was locked in a tower with his sons and left to starve; the sound of the key turning in the latch signaled the end of life outside his own subjectivity, and the beginning of his isolation and mortal terror. Dante implies in the poem that Ugolino, driven mad by hunger, feeds upon the flesh of his sons. For Dante, this symbolized betrayal, but in the context of *The Waste Land*, it perhaps resonates more clearly as the self-consumption typical of the modern, alienated individual who has been driven back upon himself by the "nightmare" of epistemology and the loss of community. The poem's reference to Coriolanus functions in a similar fashion. "Broken" and isolated after his tragic fall, the Roman General hears an "aethereal rumour," a sound of grace or spirit that momentarily reminds him of the divine order far above and beyond the political order in which he has been tragically isolated. The sense of the passage, and the significance of these allusions, all seem to conclude on the experience of solipsism, that is, the absolute isolation of the self from beings outside of it; the lonesome modern subject knows nothing but himself.

This would seem to be further confirmed by a passage from Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* that Eliot provides in the notes:

My external sensations are no less private to myself than are my thoughts or my feelings. In either case my experience falls within my own circle, a circle closed on the outside; and, with all its elements alike, every sphere is opaque to the others which surround it.... In brief, regarded as an existence which appears in a soul, the whole world for each is peculiar and private to that soul. (*Complete Poems and Plays* 54)

Taking into account the frequency of subjective isolation and solipsism as a theme in Eliot's poetry from "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" onward, J. Hillis Miller concluded that this passage and its accompanying notes provide further evidence that, for Eliot, "the mind can never bump into anything other than itself, anything stubbornly recalcitrant to its devouring power to assimilate everything" (160).

This would seem a probable conclusion. However, Jewel Spears Brooker seeks to demonstrate that it was a conclusion one could only reach if one did

not understand the passage from Bradley in the context of his philosophy.<sup>21</sup> In particular, Brooker draws attention to Bradley's concept of immediate experience as prior to the constitution of subjectivity and selfhood as abstractions within relational consciousness. Bradley's passage cannot refer to solipsism, because, in experience, the subject does not yet exist to be "cut off" from reality and its objects. Brooker argues that the "suggestion that Bradley is solipsistic derives partially from a confusion between 'my' experience and immediate experience. When Bradley argues that everything is constituted by experience, he does not mean the experience of any self; he means purely undifferentiated experience" (198). Our misunderstanding is rooted, Brooker contends, in a general misapprehension of the range and scope of idealism; that is, in a poor reading of Bradley. As she explains, some idealist philosophers, such as Berkeley, do contend that the mind knows nothing outside itself; others, Kant chief among them, argue that the mind "contributes as much to reality by knowing an object as the object itself contributes to its materiality" (194). But Bradley is an "absolute idealist" in the tradition of Hegel, believing that all things that appear separate and distinct in relational consciousness ultimately resolve into a monistic unity in immediate experience and in "suprarelational consciousness" (Brooker 197). How, Brooker asks, could Bradley's passage suggest solipsism, if he believes that the subjectivity putatively imprisoned is just one abstraction from experience in general among others, and therefore, no more real or absolute than them?

The answer may be more complicated than Brooker allows. She correctly observes that the passage Eliot quotes does not treat of solipsism. Bradley *does* dedicate a chapter to the subject earlier in the volume, however. He concludes that solipsism per se is false, for the reasons Brooker presents. But he continues that the abstraction of solipsism reminds us of a particular truth, that our "contact with Reality is through a limited aperture. For I cannot get at it directly except through the felt 'this,' and our immediate interchange and transfluence takes place through one small opening" (Bradley 260). This might have been a more apt passage for Eliot to quote, at least if he wished the "key" turning to be at once the image of subjective isolation and the small aperture onto reality that the subject might have. He did not excerpt this passage, however, but one from a section of the text dedicated to a question that contemplates the isolation of the self on a still more profound level. Bradley is exploring not whether the self can have knowledge of what is outside of it, but whether one soul can have direct knowledge of another soul, rather than the indirect knowledge communicable through physical signs.<sup>22</sup> Even with a fuller knowledge of context, then, we are left with the experience of isolation of soul from soul and the mediated nature of all

knowledge of other persons, if not the absolute isolation that constitutes solipsism. The apparent meaning of the text, which ironically juxtaposes the injunction to sympathize with lines showing souls incapable of going outside themselves to commune with another, and Miller's equation of this with the solipsistic theme Eliot seems to explore elsewhere, remain more tenable readings in the light of Bradley's ideas than does Brooker's.

The passage clearly seems to signify solipsism, despite Brooker's impressive effort to restore the proper context to it. A mere lament for solipsism does not exhaust the meaning of the passage and its accompanying note, however. By the time Eliot wrote *The Waste Land*, we have seen, he was quite familiar with the major works of English (Stonyhurst) and Belgian (Louvain) neo-Thomism. From its inception in the mid-nineteenth century, neo-Thomism had taken as its task the restoration of the modern world's trust in the power of human reason to know things in themselves—to know, in other words, the truth directly, the real in its fullness. Coffey's *Epistemology* follows the typical procedure of this restoration in seeking to demonstrate why post-Kantian theories of knowledge fail in every possible way. Maritain's *Réflexions* toed the standard neo-Thomist line when it insisted that all idealist philosophy, because it begins its theories of knowledge within the subject, cannot provide an accurate account of how the subjective knower can come to know things outside itself. Bad philosophy does not make one solipsistic. But the neo-Thomists demonstrated that the human mind is ordered to being, and that the first steps toward knowledge occur when things themselves act upon the perception of the passive intellect, in advance of the mind itself performing any act (the agent intellect). The failure of idealists to appreciate the *beginning* of knowledge in the prior activity of extra-mental beings (Maritain, *Oeuvres Complètes* 3.51), and their further failure to see that knowledge constituted a virtual identity of knower and thing known (Maritain, *Oeuvres Complètes* 3.66; cf. Maritain, *Degrees of Knowledge* 120), resulted, therefore, in philosophy that seemed to conclude upon solipsism *in spite of* human experience. Although experience and reflection on the act of thinking led one to judge that the reason encountered reality as it was, even though extra-mental being actually came to exist in the mind under another mode (intentional being), the arguments of idealist philosophers had led mankind to despair of reason. By implication, Bradley's "psychologism" led others to become "psychologistic" themselves, and thus modernity became "unreal," as persons came to believe themselves more isolated than they actually were.

Eliot had encountered this theme repeatedly in his reading of the new Scholastics before beginning his poem, and his Cambridge lectures testify that it clearly impressed upon him how acutely this modern psychologism distorted our (intellectual) understanding and then our (felt) experience of

reality. Lamentation over psychologism, romanticism, and solipsism (rather, the isolation of the self) evidently guide the darkest moments in *The Waste Land*. Given that Eliot had already become disenchanted of Bradley's account of knowledge and experience in 1915, just before his interest in the Scholastics became evident, he must have been open to the possibility that all idealism, including Bradley's, winds up in the psychologism and solipsism he deplored. However ingenious Bradley's efforts to avoid the accusation, and whatever the perceived differences between different brands of idealism, all idealism leads to the same end. Eliot had argued that Bradley's account of immediate experience as prior to the abstract forming of selfhood, after all, does not bear on our knowledge. Knowledge itself only occurs as the self and other abstractions of relational consciousness come into play. The act of knowing becomes something like a private fantasy indulged by an equally fantastic self.

Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual Talent" had proposed that the entrance of a new work of art into the ideal order of works must cause that order to be altered, and that therefore the meaning of past works of art could be altered or revised by the present (*Selected Essays* 5). I have already suggested that reading the passage from Bradley in Eliot's footnote as a gloss on the poem leads to the conclusion that the passage is indeed—pace Brooker—concerned with the isolation of the subjective soul from other souls. More provocatively perhaps, I would suggest that Eliot's reading of neo-Thomism helped him to grasp the inherent weakness of all forms of idealist epistemology. Theories of knowledge that begin in the self cannot explain how one moves beyond the self to extra-mental beings. We are no less justified, therefore, in reading the lines of Eliot's poem as a gloss on Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. The new work, the poem, changes the meaning of the philosophical work of the past (Bradley's and Eliot's), transforming it from an idealist account of knowledge to poignant testimony of the modern isolation and psychologism to which, so neo-Thomists claimed, all idealism must lead. The quotation of Bradley does not explain away, but further exemplifies, this phenomenon, and the poet critiques the philosopher. As such, the passage echoes the neo-Thomist defenses of reason against post-Kantian idealism, particularly in their attempts to show that bad philosophy leads to a decayed culture.

### *Eliot's Interactions with Maritain*

A year after Eliot first cited Maritain in *The Criterion*, he praised him again in those pages as "the most conspicuous figure, and probably the most power-

ful force, in contemporary French philosophy" ("A Commentary" 3). In the same issue, Eliot printed his own (pseudonymous) translation of Maritain's *Frontières de la poésie* as "Poetry and Religion." It would seem he had found that the exact theology had, rightly, extended via philosophy to an exact aesthetics. However, that translation marks the closest to unity Eliot's classicism and Maritain's Thomist realism would achieve. Almost immediately after his conversion in June 1927, Eliot wrote Maritain in thanks for the gift of two brief books, one on aesthetics, *Art et Scholastique* (1920), and the other on political theology, *La Primauté du Spirituel*. Responding to an invitation Maritain had made for him to collaborate on a new publication series, called Correspondence, Eliot questions his own suitability, noting that he is Anglo-Catholic, not a Roman Catholic, and that, therefore, on some points they do not see eye-to-eye (10 August 1927 Kolbsheim). Maritain's Thomism had made plausible on metaphysical grounds the classicist tendency Eliot approved and wished to promote; in doing so it may have abetted Eliot's conversion to Christianity (Takayanagi 74). But Eliot did not join what was, in his words of a decade earlier, "the only Church which can even pretend to maintain a philosophy of its own" ("A Contemporary Thomist" 312). The limit of Eliot's Catholic conversion is, in some sense, bound up with a reservation about Maritain's Thomism.

In Tomlin's memoir of Eliot, he twice notes the interest Eliot took in Maritain's work and the admiration he felt for Maritain himself. But Eliot did not think Maritain's style—of prose, perhaps, but of philosophizing in general—was a proper modernization of Aquinas's method. It was too streaked with traces of Bergson and modern French intellectual culture. Tomlin recalls that

although [Eliot] much liked Maritain as a person (as who could not?), he felt that the French post-Bergsonian intellectual approach, even if called "Neo-scholastique," differed markedly from that of St Thomas himself: it was the difference between a hovering darting kestrel and a "dumb ox" pawing at the ground. (73)

Eliot's later prose corroborates such recollections. Almost a year and a half after his conversion, Eliot reviewed the English translation of Maritain's *Three Reformers* in the *Times Literary Supplement*. Recapitulating and expanding the classicist tendency that, now, he had absorbed within French neo-Thomism, Eliot equivocates on the meaning of the latter. Neo-Thomism can

be applied to the philosophic work of Dominicans and members of other Orders which has gone on at least since the pronouncement of Leo XIII in favour of Aquinas.... Or it can be applied to the popularization of intellectual Catholicism in the life of contemporary Paris. ("Three Reformers" 818)

This distinction cuts two ways in the review. At first sight, it divides formal academic philosophy in the seminary from the mode of neo-Thomism that seemed to be transforming Parisian, and potentially London, intellectual life. But as the review continues, one senses an uncertainty on Eliot's part that the Parisian neo-Thomism of Maritain is quite authentic.

Eliot proceeds to observe that, though Maritain is "a brilliant and accomplished scholar, [he] is more important as a popularizer of ideas than as an original thinker. He owes his place partly to a charm of personality and beauty of character, to great enthusiasm, and to a vigorous and vivacious style" (818). There is a "poetic quality" in his prose that makes him "the lyrical of Thomism. The champion of intellectualism, he found his own way to Christianity by a different route; he is an emotional rather than an intellectual Catholic." Finally, Eliot acknowledges, his work "always stimulates the intellectual appetite, even though it does not always give intellectual satisfaction" (818). Only a dumb ox, methodically answering every question put to his claims, could satisfy; Maritain, in contrast, asserted more than he answered. What Eliot had praised in Aristotle—the absence of method and the willingness to risk error for the sake of intelligent observation—no longer entirely pleased when encountered in Maritain.

Eliot is careful to insist these observations are not intended as criticism or dismissal, and yet, one can hardly miss the tempering of enthusiasm for a man he had once called the most powerful force in French philosophy. One source of these qualifications may be the genre of *Three Reformers* itself. It is a work of destructive criticism, intended to show the role Martin Luther, René Descartes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau played in the advent of modern individualism, skepticism, and solipsism. While engaging these figures with the technical equipment of Aquinas, and thereby providing both substantial arguments against them as well as detailed outlines of what we might call the true Thomist anthropology, the book remains principally a polemic. According to Stephen Schloesser, it was greeted as partisan and parochial when first published in Paris, hindering Maritain's burgeoning reputation among the cultured elite. Eliot's review welcomes the book as an opportunity for the English reading public to orient itself to the more extensively developed French "classicist" or neo-Thomist culture. Through it, the metaphysical, aesthetic, and political synthesis in which Maritain had proven instrumental, could be easily encountered. Even so, the work did not give entire "intellectual satisfaction," Eliot indicates. Indeed, none of Maritain's works during the nineteen-twenties, with the possible exception of *Art et Scholastique*, is as closely argued, as "exact," as Eliot may have hoped.<sup>23</sup> As early as December 1925, he had written Herbert Read that Maritain's *Réflexions sur L'intelligence* was "valuable and significant" but disappointing

as well, because Maritain seems "in too great a hurry to arrive" at his final position. A "thorough historical defense of thomism or of the Church," careful and gradual of argument, would have been better (Eliot *Letters* 2.796). There was much enthusiasm, charm, and lyricism in the prose style, and a confidence that Aquinas can best any modern in close debate—all of which promised to draw attractive ideas into real, substantial being. If this was what the pre-conversion Eliot thought he needed, its importance seemed diminished thereafter.

*Eliot and Maritain's Turns to the Augustinian and the Affective*

Whatever role the Aristotelian-Thomist synthesis played in Eliot's conversion, and whatever role Maritain's version of it played, I would argue something particular to Eliot limited his enthusiasm for both. Eliot documented his own changing of mind at several times during his life. We know he had a brief romance with Bergson's philosophy in 1910, before immersing himself in the neo-idealism of Bradley. As we saw, this idealism gave way for a time to "relative materialism." To all appearances, Eliot's long interest in French political Catholicism, from Maurras to Maritain, served as one Virgil on the path to his conversion; the exact theology of Dante, Aquinas and *even* Maritain clearly served as another. Eliot remained in affectionate contact with Maritain for many years (as their scattered correspondence suggests), but his writings in the decades after his conversion suggest a further development of position; to wit, a loosening or a lessening of the call for the "exact" rational philosophy of being and theology that Maritain seemed to promise.

To begin with, Eliot did not conceal the direct influence on him of Blaise Pascal's skeptical Augustinian apologetics, or the indirect influence of it also discernible in T. E. Hulme's writings. In such figures, Eliot found Bradley's emphasis on points-of-view translated into ontological terms; the orders of nature, mind, and charity were distinct and discontinuous even as they ultimately constituted the whole of reality (Pascal xviii). Thus, according to Pascal, reason plays an integral role in Christian belief, but within a circumscribed horizon; he follows Saint Augustine in observing that it is perfectly rational for reason to "submit" to natural and supernatural truths that cannot be demonstrated on its terms. Reason "is then right" to submit "when it judges that it ought to submit" (Pascal 77), and submission comes well before reason has exhausted natural phenomena, much less arrived at the knowledge of God. Only the gift of faith as inspiration can carry the heart—the whole human being—to that knowledge.

If Maritain was an intellectualist whose conversion was emotional, he was also convinced that the natural reason, trained in Thomistic logic but otherwise unaided, could guide one to a certain natural knowledge of God. Eliot demonstrated a philosophical scrupulosity in his own movement toward conversion that was jaded by an idealist skepticism about the efficacy of the reason. As such, if he initially hoped for the confident intellectualism of Maritain, he clearly felt Pascal's doubts regarding the strength of reason relative to the affections (the restless movements of the will) and consequent emphasis on the supernatural order of charity. In coming to sympathize with this Jansenist Augustinianism, Eliot would have had less need of the sort of exactitude promised by Maritain's Thomism (which tended to understate Aquinas's debt to Augustine).

Even so, Maritain clearly gave Eliot hope for a modern philosophy that renewed its close contacts with theology after the fashion of medieval "ontology." Many years later, Eliot would praise the German philosopher Josef Pieper—whose work drew heavily on Aristotle and Aquinas without being properly neo-Thomist—for overcoming the modern "divorce" of philosophy and theology. Unlike idealism and (neo-realist) positivism, Pieper's philosophy recognized that its questions and methods of necessity opened onto the supernatural realm of grace with which only theology could adequately grapple (Eliot, "Introduction" to Pieper 14-15). In brief, Eliot seems to have grown less confident in the capacities of reason and philosophy to give him the knowledge of reality he desired and, at the same time, he seems to have become more confident in the capacities of faith and philosophical theology (faith seeking understanding) to do so.

We see this development manifest itself in others of Eliot's writings. In his contribution to a collection of essays on revelation among modern Christians, Eliot observed that it was not radical doubt but a misdirection of will from which the present age suffered; the nihilism that philosophical materialism seemed to predicate was nowhere near so grave as the idolatry, the "strange gods," modern persons chased (Baillie and Martin 35). Indeed, Christian apologetics that seeks to sway the secular mind by secular standards of reason can only result in defeat, Eliot writes, effectively downplaying the importance of the Thomist metaphysics (particularly its natural theology, which ostensibly aspired to just such a criterion) that had aided in his own conversion (39). In this respect, he seems once again to follow Pascal's Augustinian anthropology. As Eliot himself argued, Pascal saw "through human beings" and observed "the vanity of their thoughts and of their avocations, their dishonesty and self-deceptions, the insincerity of their emotions, their cowardice, the pettiness of their real ambitions" (Pascal xvii), all of which served to distract them from seeking God. "Distracted from distraction by

distraction," human beings restlessly avoided belief in God rather than suffering from any insurmountable intellectual difficulties (Eliot, *Complete Poems and Plays* 120).

The appearance of a fideistic or Augustinian turn is furthered by Eliot's footnote regarding his own understanding of revelation (35). He makes no mention of the essay in the volume by the English Jesuit Martin D'Arcy, which carefully delineates the division between faith and reason, nature and grace, typical of neo-Thomism. D'Arcy would cogently distinguish between the orders of grace and nature and between faith and reason (182-83). He would also underscore that modern unbelief stemmed not from its superior rationality, but from its taste for the ephemeral and from its narrow suspicion of "the old belief in reason" (189). On the whole, D'Arcy's essay would seem to synthesize Eliot's earlier search for a satisfactory philosophical realism with his later Pascalian "psychological" sympathies. But, ignoring this, Eliot refers the reader to the contribution of William Temple, Archbishop of York, as conveying his own belief (35). While this may have been just an act of filial piety on the part of a lay Anglo-Catholic to a greatly respected churchman, it is curious to note that Temple's emphasis on revelation as the Incarnation of Christ exclusively, rather than to the objectively formulated doctrines that follow from it, and his development of the novel theories of general and special revelation (which D'Arcy insists muddle perfectly clear categories [183-84]), are indicative of a modern species of Christian Platonism, where every element of reality participates directly in the grace of God. The exactitude of Aristotle and Aquinas gets lost in the haze of a world where grace abounds at every turn.<sup>24</sup> While this aspect of Temple's thought has affinities with Maritain's more Bergson-tinged theories of art and natural contemplation, it nonetheless signals a break between Eliot and the Thomist metaphysics he had thought to find in Maritain. The recovery of precise metaphysics from epistemology that Maritain proposed evidently becomes less important to Eliot than the exactitude to be found in dogmatic theology and the Christian religion more generally.

Maritain's influence on Eliot, then, must be understood as having made its greatest impact in terms of style. Maritain's writings in the nineteen-twenties equipped Eliot to reformulate his classicist preferences and admiration for the theology of the Middle Ages in terms of a compelling neo-Thomist metaphysics that promised to make the world *plausibly* and *really* meaningful, mediated through a disinterested account of being that stood against the reductive assertions of the materialists, and avoided relapsing into mere idealism. Eliot's post-conversion comments on Maritain, and philosophy and theology more generally, suggest a posterior reconsideration, through the eyes of faith, of what role reason and metaphysics need play in his religious

life. Ironically, the Bergsonian and even Platonist lyricism threaded through Maritain's writings may have limited Eliot's appreciation for Maritain's variety of Thomism, even as it faintly resembled the theology of Archbishop Temple. In consequence, as Eliot's Anglo-Catholic piety developed and found other support, his need for the Roman Catholic Thomist diminished. He continued to take an interest in Thomism in general, as the attention to the works of Etienne Gilson in *The Criterion* and the publication of Josef Pieper's works by Faber and Faber demonstrate.<sup>25</sup> But these writers signify different accounts of Thomism than Maritain's. Gilson would pioneer the idea of a "Christian Philosophy" distinct from mere philosophy in its taking revelation on board. As Eliot himself expressed, Pieper also manifested a union of philosophy and theology more successful than Maritain's, to the extent that it made this union explicit. If Maritain's influence on Eliot waned somewhat, Eliot's influence on Maritain would wax.<sup>26</sup> His literary criticism provides several important planks in the argument of Maritain's late masterpiece on the philosophy of art and knowledge, *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry* (1957), a work that provides a robust philosophical basis for reconciling Eliot's ostensibly contradictory statements on the nature of artistic impersonality and the meaning of art itself.<sup>27</sup> That work also is just one example of Maritain's departing from the strict intellectualism and realism of his early work. He and Eliot alike developed theories of affective knowledge that operated distinctly from the discursive intellect without denigrating reason itself. Indeed, Eliot and Maritain would both initially explore the idea of affective knowledge in terms of art and poetry only to turn with increasing interest to the mystics. Maritain's masterpiece, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, offers in its first half the defense of metaphysical realism Eliot had clearly desired prior to his conversion; but its second half turns entirely to an exploration of the knowledge made possible in mystical experience and theology. There, Maritain proves receptive to the ontologist tradition represented by Saints Augustine and Aquinas and the psychologist tradition represented by Saint John of the Cross. Eliot's work would take a similar turn, as evidenced by his quotations in *Four Quartets* from Saint John of the Cross, Julian of Norwich, and the anonymous author of the *Cloud of Unknowing*—and above all by his debt to Book XI of Saint Augustine's *Confessions*, which arguably provides the intellectual framework for the poem's extended meditation on time and eternity. Thus, the later work of Eliot and Maritain hints at affinities regarding mysticism, affective knowledge, and poetry that Maritain, at least, clearly perceived and which suggest more extensive cross-influences than we could explore here. Be that as it may, Maritain's attractive style, knowledgeable engagement with contemporary philosophers, and confident presentation of neo-Thomism

as *the* return to the real which the modern West desperately required would encourage Eliot to renew his interest in philosophy. Idealism may lead to relativist materialism, but Thomist realism led to being, to the substance of things, and from being to God. Eliot would follow its progress even to the point of conversion to Anglo-Catholicism and, in so doing, would cooperate with Maritain in forging a curious alliance between artistic modernism and neo-Thomist thought.

Villanova University

### NOTES

1. Eliot's Harvard professor, the American idealist, Josiah Royce, praised Leo XIII's *Aeterni Patris* in an essay, and may have shared this enthusiasm with his students.

2. This observation echoes his endorsement of Aristotle in "The Perfect Critic" (*The Sacred Wood* 9).

3. In typically evocative fashion, Coffey writes,

The history of philosophy is strewn with the wreckage of false philosophical theories propounded by scientific and other specialists. The mechanical, evolutionary, and agnostic philosophies based on the physical sciences about the middle of the last century by such men as Huxley, Spencer, Büchner, and Haekel are cases in point. . . . Nowadays the religious question in the main resolves itself into Catholicism *versus* Unbelief, Agnosticism, Monism, Naturalism. The intellectual difficulties which impede the acceptance of catholic truth by the modern mind are not concerned with individual dogmas; they lie deeper down; they refer to the possibility of Divine Revelation, to the existence of a Supreme Being, to the binding force of morality, to the very capacity of the human mind for attaining to any certain knowledge about the origin, nature, and destiny of man and the universe. These difficulties, arising out of false theories of knowledge, enhance both the interest and the importance of Epistemology for the catholic student. (6-8)

4. Eliot quotes Bradley's first definition of feeling as immediate experience: "the general condition before distinctions and relations have been developed, and where as yet neither any subject nor object exists" (*Knowledge and Experience* 16). His second acceptance of feeling is, anything at any stage of mental life "in so far as that is only present and simply is." Crucially, "it is only in immediate experience that knowledge and its object are one" (*Knowledge and Experience* 19). In an effort to clarify the posterior nature of selfhood—the self as one more object abstracted from experience among others—Eliot writes,

We have no right, except in the most provisional way, to speak of *my* experience, since the I is a construction out of experience, an abstraction from it; and the *that's*, the browns and hards and flats, are equally ideal constructions from experience, as ideal as atoms. An *élan vital* or 'flux' is equally abstracted from experience, for it is only in departing from immediate experience that we are aware of such a process. In short, we can only discuss experience from one side and

then from the other, correcting these partial views. (*Knowledge and Experience* 19)

5. Eliot follows Bradley in finding ingenious means of affirming the reality of ideas by describing them as continuous with and operating upon the real:

...[T]he idea with which this reality is qualified is itself real, though of a reality which we cannot possibly define; for, though its existence as a fact is another thing from its meaning, yet its meaning is inextricably involved in its existence as a fact. The idea is something real, or it could not be even ideal.... Reality is simply that which is intended and the ideal is that which intends; and ultimately—for we have no reason to stop—the intending is the totality of intending, and the intended is the whole of reality.... Thus, of course, an idea may justly be predicated of an ideal world; and our interpretation of the character of *Ivanhoe* may qualify the assumed reality of the story just as truly as the story itself, as a story, qualifies reality. The ideal world of the story qualifies reality—in what way, we are ultimately in ignorance—and through this world our conception of the character of *Ivanhoe* is attached to reality. (Coffey, *Epistemology* 1.6-8, 35-38)

6. Sanford Schwartz's *The Matrix of Modernism* explores the ways in which Eliot, Pound and other modernists did seek to circumscribe the authority and reach of modern science by skeptically insisting it only accounted for truths in abstract systems hermetically sealed from reality per se.

7. Eliot insists that

There is no absolute point of view from which real and ideal can finally be separated and labeled. All of our terms turn out to be unreal abstractions; but we can defend them, and give them a kind of reality and validity (the only validity which they can possess or can need) by showing that they express the theory of knowledge which is implicit in all our practical activity. And therefore we allow ourselves to hold both that a lower stage of mere feeling is irrelevant and that knowledge is based upon and developed out of feeling. (*Knowledge and Experience* 18)

8. Eliot sets forth a principle that will guide his prose work for many years, informing even his post-conversion writings:

For me, as for Santayana, philosophy is chiefly literary criticism and conversation about life.... The only reason why relativism does not do away with philosophy altogether, after all, is that there is no such thing to abolish! There is art, and there is science. And there are works of art, and perhaps of science, which would never have occurred had not many people been under the impression that there was philosophy. (*Knowledge and Experience* 81)

One hears a reference to Santayana's *Three Philosophical Poets* (1910) and, through that, Eliot's devotion to the ordered poetic universe of Dante.

9. See especially Santayana's evocative self-portrait concealed as a review of the poet Jean Lahor in "A Religion of Disillusion" (*Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* 141-150).

10. Coffey, in typically triumphalist language, argues that epistemology had been well developed in Scholastic philosophy, just not as a separate discipline:

The erroneous impression is sometimes conveyed by modern writers that the age of philosophical criticism, first prepared by Descartes (1596-1650), only dawned with Kant (1724-1804); that previously philosophers in the main had naively and unreflectingly taken for granted as unquestionable a multitude of epistemological assumptions which post-Kantian criticism has at all events fearlessly analyzed.... The scholasticism of the Middle Ages,—which it has been

so customary among modern advocates of untrammelled criticism to regard as a system truly typical of naive dogmatism,—devoted its highest efforts of thought for centuries to distinctively epistemological problems in its controversies on universal ideas, on individuation and distinctions, and on the respective domains of reason and faith. (13)

In a more tempered observation, Cardinal Mercier's *Manual* justifies the presence of "Criteriology" (a branch of epistemology that investigates the criteria for affirming different kinds of knowledge, rather than the exploration of *how* the human mind knows, which he treats in his "Psychology," or theory of organic being) simply as a matter of being responsive to modern needs and conventions:

Further, although the problems concerning the origins and validity of our intellectual cognitions belong really to psychology, their exceptional importance since the time of Kant has led philosophers to treat them apart and to regard them as a separate branch of study under the name of *ideology* or *theory of ideas*, and *epistemology* or *criteriology*. . . . Criteriology or critical philosophy has also in these days a separate treatment even with those who keep to the ancient classification. (17-18)

11. Eliot describes what can more properly be called the moderate metaphysical realism and intellectualism (as opposed to voluntarism) of medieval mystical theology thus:

There is a type of religious mysticism which found expression in the twelfth century, and which is taken up into the system of Aquinas. Its origin is in the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle 1072b and elsewhere, and in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, and it is the opposite of Bergsonism. You know how the Absolute of Bergson is arrived at: by a turning back on the path of thought, by divesting one's mind of the apparatus of distinction and analysis, by plunging into the flow of immediate experience. For the twelfth century, the divine vision or enjoyment of God could only be attained by a process in which the analytic intellect took part; it was through and by and beyond discursive thought that man could arrive at beatitude. This was the form of mysticism consummated in Dante's time. It is very different from the mysticism of Ignatius, Theresa and St. John of the Cross, who were romantics, and from that of Eckhardt, who was a heretic. In its own way it was perfect. (*Varieties* 99)

His term "ontologism" helpfully distinguishes this tradition from the modern mystics and philosophers, but should not be confused with theological ontologism, a nineteenth-century school of thought that, ironically, based itself on the Cartesian claim that the human intellect has an innate knowledge of God as Being Itself (cf. McCool 114-118).

12. William Marx briefly discusses the short-lived classical Renaissance in French Literature that was silenced by the outbreak of the First World War (72-77). Hulme's "Romanticism and Classicism" was reprinted as a chapter of *Speculations*.

13. Maritain condemns Kant's modeling of his theory of knowledge on the positive sciences, failing to appreciate that knowledge or ideas are not merely objects to be studied after the fashion of material phenomena. He notes, "the majority of philosophers after Kant have been no less naive than he" (translation mine, *Oeuvres Complètes* 3.16). Following Coffey and Mercier, he reaffirms that the Scholastic and ancient philosophers (the "traditional" philosophers, as neo-Thomists called them in opposition to post-Cartesian philosophy) had thoroughly developed epistemologies, which they simply did not construct in separated treatises or disciplines (3.22).

14. The basis of Maritain's polemic here lies, of course, in Aquinas, who argues regarding intellectual substances,

[I]n all powers which can reflect on their own acts, the act must first bear on some other object

and only afterwards on its own act. For if intellect understands itself to understand, it must first be given that it understands some thing and then understands itself to understand: for the understanding that intellect understands is of some object. Thus, either we proceed to infinity or, if we come to some first thing understood, that cannot be understanding itself, but some intelligible thing. (*Summa Contra Gentiles* 3.26, quoted in McInerney 268-269)

15. Maritain condemns the starting point of idealist speculation, saying,

If one begins by assuming that the "objective concept" or the object of thought can be treated and studied as something other from the extra-mental being that renders it present to the intellect, as a simple phenomenon of consciousness, one will never be able to rejoin it in a valid way to being. (translation mine, *Oeuvres Complètes* 3.51)

16. He writes, "without the least blending of their respective beings, each keeping intact its own nature, one thing becomes the other.... [T]he union of the knower and the known is thus much more intimate and more perfect than the union of matter and form, and as much more perfect as knowledge is of an order more elevated" [translation mine] (3.66). Cf. *Degrees of Knowledge* 120.

17. See chapter four, "Notional and Real Assent" (49-92).

18. Maritain writes, in contrast to James and Bradley,

The high, classical discipline of the ancients and medievals joined a sort of intellectual asceticism with a particular kind of purification that demanded the pure contemplation of the object in its otherness, in abstraction from all the particular ways it affects us—without thought of the good or our appetite—touching the things themselves with the intelligence alone (of which the proper function is to become the other as such, with the unique power to assimilate things in a non-material mode of being), the philosopher, in his function as philosopher, practices a severe disinterestedness, disappropriating, disengaging from, his ego and his concupiscent inclinations, extinguishing what is in him of the flesh and blood: in brief, he spiritualizes himself as much as possible. (translation mine, 309)

19. Writing of the variety of dialectical realisms that appeared in postwar Paris, Schloesser observes,

All these realisms attempted to combine, in a dialectical synthesis, both the positivist's observed world as well as something else unseen. These dialectical realisms promised the postwar epoch new possibilities: that the logical and linear world of our waking state is not the deepest truth of our lives (surrealism); that there are forces for change that escape both our observation and control (magic realism); that societal progress towards utopian equality is a real possibility (socialist realism). Avant-garde realisms—synthetic unions of both a nineteenth-century modernist's embrace of reality as well as an anti-modernist yearning for something beyond—were ambivalent reactions to an imagined "generation of 1885" whose liberal rationalism was held responsible for the war. (7-8)

He further explains regarding Catholic realism, or mystic modernism, in particular:

Traditional Catholic ideas like hylomorphism, sacramentalism, and transubstantiation were also "dialectical realisms." In the nineteenth-century context, the unseen or metaphysical part of the Catholic dialectic seemed to be mere superstition, radically incompatible with modern realism. In the postwar epoch, that same unseen element could be newly appreciated as one among a host of avant-garde promises: that appearances deceive; that the deepest reality may be hidden within; and that substantial change is possible. In this new context, Catholic dialectical realism seemed compatible with secular dialectical realisms, and could be reworked as being

both anti-modernist and ultramodernist. (8)

20. The revised passage referring to Eliot replaces a sentence referring to the essayist, Henri Massis (1886-1970), Maritain's former colleague in *L'Action française*, and to Henri Ghéon, the former avant-garde writer, veteran, and Catholic novelist: "Aujourd'hui Massis et Ghéon obligent la distraite critique à entendre les revendications d'une intelligence qui prétend être autre chose qu'une petite pellicule posée à la surface des chose" (*Réflexions* 317). In replacing this earlier reference to two writers associated with French right-wing Catholicism and monarchism with Eliot, Maritain hints at the success of Eliot's reputation, and his work at *The Criterion*, of creating a European Christian consciousness that was integral to "classicism" but unencumbered by the particularities of French politics: a consciousness which became central to later neo-Thomism as well.

21. This argument has gained considerable currency, as suggested by Donald Childs's discussion of it in his study of scholarship on Bradley and Eliot (10).

22. While acknowledging the possibility of the communion or direct communication of two souls, Bradley takes it as normative that souls can know the same things only via the media of external appearances: "No experience can lie open to inspection from the outside; no direct guarantee of identity is possible. Both our knowledge of sameness, and our way of communication, are indirect and inferential. They must make the circuit, and must use the symbol, of bodily change" (346-47).

23. John Gould Fletcher, in an overall positive review of a 1927 translation of *Art et Scholastique* in *The Criterion* would repeatedly criticize the "foggy" thought at key moments in its argument (347). This seems to be in line with Eliot's own view of Maritain.

24. Temple's essay begins by a critique of the modern tendency to embrace either idealism or materialism that operates on the lines given in this essay. The alternative to these two paths, however, is not a synthesis of faith and reason but of general and special revelation:

Unless all existence is a medium of Revelation, no particular Revelation is possible; for the possibility of Revelation depends on the personal quality of that supreme and Ultimate Reality which is God. If there is no Ultimate Reality, which is the ground of all else, then there is no God to be revealed; if that Reality is not personal, there can be no special Revelation but only uniform procedure; if there be an Ultimate Reality, and this is personal, then all existence is Revelation. Either all occurrences are in some degree revelation of God, or else there is no such revelation at all; for the conditions of the possibility of any revelation require that there should be nothing which is not revelation. (96)

25. Takayanagi records many of the most prominent references to neo-Thomism in *The Criterion*, citing in particular the attention Eliot's review gave to Etienne Gilson and Martin D'Arcy (85-86).

26. Maritain's influence on Eliot's political and social criticism seems, however, to have remained capital. The acknowledgements to Eliot's *The Idea of a Christian Society* list Maritain's works in general, and *Integral Humanism* (1936) in particular, alongside the English Catholic Christopher Dawson and the Anglo-Catholic V.A. Demant as formative influences (*Christianity and Culture* 4).

27. Maritain cites Eliot frequently as an authority in *Creative Intuition*: as a quintessential modern poet who has realized "creative intuition" in his work (77); he clarifies and develops Eliot's early reflections on "emotion" and "feeling" (120-121, note 16); he modifies Eliot's idea of "impersonality" (143, note 55); quotes him approvingly on inspiration (241); cites him in support of modern poetry's turning from the "music of the ear" that prosody satisfies to an interior intellectual music (321); and assents to Eliot's claims for Dante as a pure poet

who can be appreciated by the reader who does not share his religious convictions (380-381).

### WORKS CITED

- Aquinas, Thomas. *Summa Theologica*. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Vol. 1. New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1948.
- Baillie, John and Hugh Martin, eds. *Revelation*. London: Faber and Faber, 1937.
- Bradley, F. H. *Appearance and Reality*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1897.
- Brooker, Jewel Spears. *Mastery and Escape: T. S. Eliot and the Dialectic of Modernism*. Amherst: U of Massachusetts P, 1994.
- Childs, Donald J. *From Philosophy to Poetry: T. S. Eliot's Study of Knowledge and Experience*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- Coffey, P. *Epistemology, Or the Theory of Knowledge: An Introduction to General Metaphysics*. 2 Vols. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1958.
- Eliot, T. S. "A Commentary." *The Criterion* 5.1 (January 1927): 1-6.
- . *Christianity and Culture*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1976.
- . *The Complete Poems and Plays: 1909-1950*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1980.
- . "A Contemporary Thomist." *The New Statesman* 29 December 1917: 312-13.
- . *Essays Ancient and Modern*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936.
- . "The Idea of a Literary Review." *The Criterion* 4.1 (January 1926): 4.
- . Introduction. *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*. By Josef Pieper. Trans. Alexander Dru. London: Faber and Faber, 1952.
- . *Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley*. London: Faber and Faber, 1964.
- . *The Letters of T.S. Eliot. Volume 1: 1898-1922 Revised Edition*. Ed. Valerie Eliot and Hugh Haughton. London: Faber and Faber, 2009.
- . *The Letters of T.S. Eliot. Volume 2: 1923-1925*. Ed. Valerie Eliot and Hugh Haughton. London: Faber and Faber, 2009.
- . Letter to Jacques Maritain. 10 August 1927. Jacques and Raïssa Maritain Archive, Kolbsheim.
- . Letter to Jacques Maritain. 24 July 1938. Jacques and Raïssa Maritain Archive, Kolbsheim.
- . "A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy." *International Journal of Ethics* 28.1 (Oct. 1917): 137-140.
- . *The Sacred Wood*. London: Faber and Faber, 1997.
- . *Selected Essays 1917-1932*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1932.
- (unsigned). "Three Reformers." *Times Literary Supplement* 8 November 1928: 818.
- . *The Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry*. Ed. Ronald Schuchard. San Diego: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1996.
- Fedoryka, Damian P. "The Concept of 'Gift' as Hermeneutical Key to the Dignity of the Human Person." *Logos* 11.1 (Winter 2008): 49-69.
- Fletcher, John Gould. "Review of *Art et Scolastique* and *The Philosophy of Art*." *The Criterion* 11.36 (1929): 346-349.

- Hulme, T. E. *Speculations*. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987.
- Maritain, Jacques. *The Degrees of Knowledge*. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1995.
- . *Réflexions sur l'intelligence*. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1924.
- Maritain, Jacques and Raïssa. *Oeuvres Complètes* Vol. 3. Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1984.
- Marx, William. *Naissance de la Critique Moderne: La Littérature selon Eliot et Valéry*. Arras: Artois Presses Université, 2002.
- McCool, Gerald. *Nineteenth Century Scholasticism: The Search for a Unitary Method*. New York: Fordham UP, 1989.
- McInerny, Ralph, ed. and trans. *Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings*. London: Penguin Books, 1998.
- Mercier, Cardinal, et al. *A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*. 2 Vols. Trans. T. L. Parker and S. A. Parker. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1919.
- Miller, J. Hillis. *Poets of Reality: Six Twentieth-Century Writers*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1974.
- Newman, John Henry. *A Grammar of Assent*. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1979.
- Pascal, Blaise. *Pensées*. Trans. W. F. Trotter. Intro. T. S. Eliot. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2003.
- Perrier, Joseph Louis. *The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Columbia UP, 1909.
- Santayana, George. "Philosophical Heresy." *The Essential Santayana*. Ed. The Santayana Edition. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2009.
- . *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*. Ed. Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., et al. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989.
- Schloesser, Stephen. *Jazz Age Catholicism: Mystic Modernism in Postwar Paris, 1919-1933*. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 2005.
- Schwartz, Sanford. *The Matrix of Modernism: Pound, Eliot, and Early Twentieth-Century Thought*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985.
- Takayanagi, Shun'ichi. "T. S. Eliot, Jacques Maritain, and Neo-Thomism." *The Modern Schoolman* 73.1 (November 1995): 71-90.
- Tomlin, E. W. F. *T. S. Eliot: A Friendship*. London: Routledge, 1988.
- Wiener, Norbert. "Relativism." *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 11.21 (8 October 1914): 561-71.

Copyright of Religion & Literature is the property of Religion & Literature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.